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<COTX1>A number of authors have recently brought the Confucian tradition into meaningful 
contact with the theory and practice of democracy. The literature includes accounts of what 
Confucian democracy is or would be,1 explorations of the relationship between Confucianism 
and fundamental features of political liberalism such as rights,2 and a variety of attempts to link 
Confucianism and, more broadly, Chinese political theory and practice in general to theories of 
deliberative democracy in particular.3 In this essay, I would like to add to this growing 
discussion by thinking about ways in which a Confucian valuation of and deference to the 
elderly might challenge and inform liberal democracy.  
<TX>Liberal democracy aims to treat all adult citizens as politically equal. Once a 
citizen is over the age of majority, then—at least in standard cases in which a person's right to 
participate is not curtailed by a felony conviction, for example—she is deemed a full-fledged 
member of the community and in theory has equal standing with all other adult citizens when it 
comes to making policy and participating in the political realm in general. While the liberalism 
of liberal democracy will typically tolerate a significant degree of social and economic inequality 
among adult citizens as the necessary by-product of valuing individual property rights and other 
kinds of individual freedoms, it is committed to the fundamental idea that all adult citizens are 
and must be treated as political equals.  
In what follows, I want to consider three main questions. First: Is there any plausible 
alternative to a standard "all adult citizens have equal political standing" model of democracy 
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that could be drawn from a specifically Confucian valuing of elder members of the community? 
Second: Insofar as there is a plausible alternative, what might it reveal about differences between 
how liberalism and Confucianism think of human selves as located in time? Third: What sort of 
difference would it make if the Confucian valuing of age were implemented via informal social 
norms, on the one hand, or via explicit institutional mechanisms and procedures, on the other? 
I will begin by outlining a hypothetical Confucian version of deliberative democracy that 
allocates opportunity within a democratic community's deliberative forums so as to allocate 
political power in a way that tracks the age of adult citizens. I will consider the ways in which 
such a Confucian version of deliberative democracy is related to other proposals for Confucian 
democracy and various ways it might provide a plausible alternative to standard liberal versions 
of deliberative democracy. Specifically, I will focus on the ways that such a hypothetical 
Confucian deliberative democracy treats all citizens as politically equal over the course of an 
average lifetime, even though it does not treat all adult citizens as political equals at any given 
time. By comparing and contrasting the synchronic equality of standard liberal versions of 
deliberative democracy with the diachronic equality of this hypothetical, Confucian-inspired 
deliberative democracy and by considering the ways in which such a Confucian-inspired 
deliberative democracy is a formalized version of what Confucian ritual propriety aims to 
achieve, we can identify an independently interesting Confucian notion of human selves as 
essentially extended in time. Finally, I will consider the differences between infusing a 
Confucian valuing of the elderly into democracy via informal mechanisms and doing so via more 
formal institutional structures and procedures. 
<H1>Age, Speaking Time, and Democratic Deliberation 
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<TX1>There are many facets to the Confucian tradition, and there are multiple ways in 
which one might try to apply the Confucian valuing of the elderly to contemporary community 
life. Confucianism emphasizes the virtue of xiào (孝), or filial piety, and at least part of that 
virtue involves a specific sort to deference toward older family members. Beyond that, the 
Confucian virtue of lǐ (禮), or ritual propriety, demands among other things that one behave 
deferentially toward elder members of one's community, and that one do so in ways that track 
subtle differences in status that are partially a function of an individual's age. 
<TX> A Confucian deference toward the elderly is enmeshed in various other Confucian virtues, 
and the quick gloss I have given only hints at the ways in which such deference is grounded in 
the overall tradition. And, admittedly, Confucianism is not unique among the traditions of 
China—much less the traditions of other cultures—in its insistence that people deserve some sort 
of deference simply on account of their age. Nevertheless, both the degree to which 
Confucianism values the aged and the centrality of that value to the tradition makes deference 
toward the elderly a defining characteristic of the Confucian tradition. 
In order to consider whether Confucianism can provide a plausible alternative to the "all 
adult citizens have equal political standing" model of liberal democracy, in what follows I will 
consider first a specific Confucian-inspired variation on the liberal deliberative democracy 
proposed by a number of theorists. Some stage setting will be helpful. Deliberative democratic 
theory comes in many forms, but they all insist that something important is missing in the 
preference-combining mechanisms that are at the heart of aggregative democracy. Deliberative 
democrats typically identify what is missing as one or more of the following: the rationality or 
rational justifiability of the results of the policy-making process; significant opportunity for the 
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policy preferences of community members to be transformed by the decision-making process;4 
or the overall legitimacy of the process.5 Often, what is seen as lacking involves all three.  
 In order to improve upon aggregative democracy, the deliberative democratic solution is 
to add deliberation to the democratic process. Details vary depending on the specific proposal, 
but the general idea is to set up a deliberative forum and then coax, encourage, or possibly even 
require community members to work together to try to reach meaningful agreement on policy by 
engaging in deliberation with one another. Ideally, such deliberation will lead to agreement about 
important community decisions, but, if the deliberation fails to reach meaningful agreement, the 
processes of aggregative voting and other hardball political activities such as bargaining can 
come into play in addition to—and, importantly, after—deliberation in order to set policy.  
 I want to focus on the kind of political-liberalism-inspired deliberation that is associated 
with the touchstone work of Gutmann and Thompson,6 but which is widely supported by 
deliberative democrats, especially those who are broadly liberal in their commitments and 
outlook.7 Gutmann and Thompson allow that both the electoral mechanisms of aggregative 
democracy and the associated processes of political bargaining might be fine ways of 
establishing policy in some cases, but in other cases—especially where there is deeply 
entrenched, morally charged disagreement within a community—the legitimacy of the 
community decision-making process requires that members of the community come together and 
discuss their policy preferences in a rather constrained way. Specifically, Gutmann and 
Thompson require that community members offer explicit reasons in support of their preferred 
policies, rather than merely expressing their support for such policies. According to the ideal of 
such deliberative democracy, one should not just announce the policy preferences one has, at 
least in situations in which there is morally charged disagreement. One must also offer reasons in 
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support of one’s preferences. Moreover, reason giving must take place in a particular way. The 
reasons must be framed in terms of the common good (not in terms of mere self-interest), and 
they must be publicly accessible (meaning, roughly, that the truth and relevance of what is 
offered as a reason in support of a policy position must be assessable equally by all members of a 
community). Beyond constraints on the reasons themselves, the explicit reason-giving process 
must be marked by the exemplification of particular virtues by the deliberators—broadly liberal 
virtues such as tolerance for difference of opinion and more specific virtues such as reciprocity.8 
On this kind of liberal deliberation, the entire deliberative process aims to support the 
political equality that is at the heart of political liberalism, and to protect and insulate it from 
both economic and social inequalities.9 In concrete terms, liberal deliberation protects political 
equality by providing a forum that heads off the aggregative mechanism of voting. The 
motivation for wanting to do so is that mere voting processes are seen as ineliminably 
susceptible to the influences of economic and social inequalities and are therefore potentially 
damaging to the enjoyment of political equality. In addition, the strictures on the appropriate 
exchange of reasons that are essential to the deliberative forum serve to limit self-interested 
bargaining of the sort that happens in association not only with aggregative voting, but with 
many other kinds of political situations. Though the motivation for limiting such bargaining 
might seem obvious, it will still help to highlight it here: self-interested bargaining will (it 
seems10) be driven by and will reinforce (and possibly even exacerbate) the economic and social 
inequalities that exist in a community.11 
The feature of liberal deliberation involving the defense of political equality is typically 
manifest in part by giving everyone in a community an equal say within the deliberative forum. 
At a most basic level, this usually means giving everyone an equal amount of time in which to 
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speak, and it often also involves the introduction of structural features such as the presence of a 
moderator whose job involves adjusting for emerging patterns of dominance in the conversation 
(or at least those patterns of conversational dominance that are not driven solely by prowess in 
logical argumentation).12  
What might a specifically Confucian-inspired alternative to liberal deliberation be? There 
are a number of different avenues we might take here, and indeed there are suggestions already 
available in the literature.13 Suppose we think of Confucian deliberation as aiming to fill the 
same role in an eventual Confucian version of deliberative democracy as liberal deliberation is to 
fill in an eventual liberal deliberative democracy. That is, Confucian deliberation will be added 
to full-blown aggregative democracy as a kind of decision-making forum of first resort, at least 
in the case of deep, morally charged disagreement about policy within an otherwise established 
democratic community.14 Ideally, for the decisions for which this forum is appropriate, 
agreement will be reached by deliberation, and the mechanisms of aggregation and political 
bargaining will be used only as a last resort.  
Confucian deliberation could be similar to the proposed liberal deliberation in some 
ways, but there would be crucial differences. For example, rather than explicit reason giving as 
the definitive feature of deliberation, Confucian deliberation could be guided by speech acts 
constrained by the social pragmatics embodied in Confucian ritual (lǐ, 禮) and tradition. 
Depending on what features of Confucian ritual are emphasized, we could come up with a 
Confucian version of democratic deliberative democracy that, for example, downplays Gutmann 
and Thompson's explicit-reason-giving requirement in favor of a requirement that one's policy 
preferences be expressed in accord with Confucian ritual and get supported via speech acts that 
are broadly constrained by Confucian social pragmatics. I will not explore that possibility in 
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much detail in what follows but will focus instead on a hypothetical Confucian deliberative 
forum within which the Confucian valuation of the elderly is made explicit by allocating 
speaking time to participants in a way that tracks the participants' ages. Such a Confucian 
deliberative forum will highlight and defend a version of a specifically Confucian social 
hierarchy based on age.15 
 There are two broad ways in which a Confucian deference to age could be incorporated 
into democratic deliberation. First, the deference could be produced as a result of ritual-inspired 
deferent behavior on the part of participants in the forum who have internalized Confucian social 
pragmatics, even without explicitly allocating extra speaking time to people the older they get. If 
the majority of the participants in the deliberative forum were to have a tendency to defer to 
elder members of the community by refraining from certain kinds of criticism and by taking the 
utterances of their elders more seriously than the utterances of younger members of the 
community, then the deliberative forum would be marked by a Confucian deference to the aged, 
even in the absence of any explicit changes to the procedures that constitute a non-Confucian, 
Gutmann-and-Thompson-style deliberative forum. 
 Alternatively, the Confucian deference to the elderly could be incorporated into a 
democratic deliberative forum in a more obvious and explicit way. In concrete terms, imagine an 
up-and-running Confucian deliberative forum in which community members come together to 
communicate about policy choices, prior to allowing political bargaining and aggregative voting 
mechanisms to run their course and determine policy. In this forum, the amount of say that any 
given person has is determined by that person’s age in the following way: the older a person is, 
the more speaking time she has.  
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As one way to pump intuitions, imagine that every person over a given age—say, age 
eighteen—is admitted to the deliberative forum, but that mere admittance does not confer any 
privilege to speak. For every five years a person is aged over twenty, one minute is given to that 
person’s allotted speaking time in the deliberative forum. Thus, twenty-year-olds are allowed 
only to attend silently and learn from the deliberative forum, forty-year-old participants each are 
allotted four minutes to speak, and eighty-year-olds would each be allotted twelve minutes to 
speak. Variations in the algorithm used to determine speaking time would track different 
conceptions of the appropriate privileges of age. My concern here is not with the exact details of 
the amount of time a person has and how that amount is calculated. Rather, I introduce this 
example as one way to think about how a Confucian respect for age might be incorporated into a 
working deliberative forum. However such Confucian deliberation gets spelled out in detail, it 
will reject the basic requirement of standard liberal versions of democratic deliberation that 
everyone in the forum have an equal chance to speak.  
Such a proposal could provide a plausible way to introduce some sort of deliberation into 
various cultural contexts, depending on how deeply infused a Confucian valuing of age is in a 
given context. My hope is that the proposal might help in thinking about how to improve actual 
governance in various real-world contexts, but evaluating the likelihood that such Confucian 
deliberation could be implemented is not my concern here. Rather, I am interested primarily in 
how we might evaluate this ideal of Confucian deliberation vis-à-vis the ideal of standard "all 
citizens are political equals" deliberation put forward by liberal deliberative democrats such as 
Gutmann and Thompson. 
It might seem as if the proposal of introducing a deliberative forum that allocates 
additional speaking time to people depending on how old they are would be politically naive, at 
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least if the proposal is meant literally. As I discuss later, there is value to considering such a 
proposal, even if it never would be implemented, because a fine-grained look at potential 
objections to the proposal and how they compare and contrast to objections that could be raised 
against more straightforwardly liberal proposals for deliberative democracy reveals important 
information about standard liberal assumptions about the nature of political equality and about 
ways of thinking about political selves through time. However, even when taken as a literal 
proposal for how to structure a deliberative democratic forum in a Confucian cultural setting, the 
hypothetical Confucian deliberative forum I am considering is no more naive or improbable than 
other proposals that have been made in the literature on Confucianism or even implemented as 
real-world experiments by deliberative democrats. Daniel A. Bell, for instance, has considered 
concrete ways in which a community might work Confucian commitments into democracy, and 
he even explicitly suggests that seating arrangements could manifest respect for the elderly in 
deliberative forums by allowing the elderly to have better seating positions.16 James Fishkin and 
his collaborators have theorized about and experimented in real-world situations—both in and 
outside of China—with various sorts of deliberative forums that, from the perspective of many 
people who are entrenched in a nondeliberative vision of democracy that emphasizes hardball 
political bargaining and the messy amorality of so many contemporary political campaigns, 
would look equally far-fetched. For instance, in what Fishkin, Baogang He, and Alice Shu 
describe as the first Chinese deliberative poll, the town of Zeguo in Zhejiang Province conducted 
a policy poll after a kind of deliberative forum that included “Chinese indigenous deliberative 
methods” such as having “democratic heart-to-heart talk[s].”17 So even if at first the 
Confucianism-inspired deliberative forum I am considering here seems unlikely ever to be 
implemented, it is not obviously more implausible than other proposals in the literature, and, in 
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any case, we should be cautious about relying too heavily on our initial conceptions of what is 
possible and probable when trying to think about the possibilities of democracy. 
So before moving on to a detailed consideration of objections that might be raised to this 
hypothetical Confucian-inspired deliberative forum and what those objections reveal to us, I 
want to make clear the following: 
1. <NL>I am here considering a hypothetical system in which older participants are 
given more speaking time in a democratic deliberative forum than younger 
participants, and this is meant literally. 
2. Even if the forum in question were not literally to allocate additional speaking 
time to older participants, the consideration of the situation in which literal 
speaking time is allocated unequally is helpful to us in understanding the ways 
in which a Confucian deliberative democracy might look different than a more 
straightforwardly liberal deliberative democracy. 
3. Regardless of whether or not such a Confucian deliberative forum is ever 
implemented, the consideration of it and the comparison of it to the kinds of 
deliberative democratic experiments conducted by people like James Fishkin 
and advocated by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson helps us understand 
important assumptions about the nature of liberal democracy and its 
conceptions of fairness. 
<H1>Evaluating a Confucian Age-Privileging Deliberative Forum 
<TX1>At the very start, it might seem as if the inequality of allotted speaking time in this 
Confucian-inspired deliberative forum would be unfair and ad hoc—that there is something 
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prima facie unjust about the unequal allotted speaking times in Confucian deliberation, at least in 
contrast to the liberal alternative.  
<TX>How might a defender of Confucian deliberation respond? On the one hand, such 
an objection might seem simply to amount to an insistence that a person’s age is not a legitimate 
factor in determining the amount of say she should have in community decision making (at least 
for anyone at or above the age of majority). If that is what the objection amounts to, a defender 
of Confucian deliberation could simply say that the objection begs the central question against 
Confucian deliberation.  
Leaving aside the line of response to the initial objection that such inequality in speaking 
time would be unjust, I want to explore a way in which the social inequality expressed in the 
unequal allotment of speaking time might—in spite of first appearances—really be perfectly 
compatible with a kind of meaningful political equality, even a political equality that liberals 
should recognize. If so, then even though the proposed Confucian deliberation is driven by an 
acceptance of a particular social hierarchy involving age that is prima facie incompatible with a 
liberal insistence on keeping such social inequalities out of the political process (at least insofar 
as we are talking only about people over the age of majority), on closer analysis the Confucian 
alternative is not as antithetical to meaningful political equality as it at first seems.  
Assuming variation in age within a community, there is, of course, going to be unequal 
say in an individual Confucian deliberative session, considered in itself. However, if we begin by 
looking at individual community members rather than individual deliberative sessions, then, over 
the course of an average human life-span, we see that every person’s opportunity to speak in the 
totality of Confucian deliberation sessions that she can be expected to attend is equal to the 
opportunity of everyone else. Over the course of an average lifetime, everyone will have an 
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equal amount of time to participate in a Confucian deliberative forum. It is only if we look at 
participation in deliberation at the temporal scale of an individual deliberative session (or at a 
scale of time that encompasses a small or relatively low number of deliberative sessions) that the 
inequality of allotted speaking times seems to lead to age-driven inequality of opportunity to 
participate in political discussion and decision making. 
Of course, some people will in fact not live as long as others, and consequently their 
actual amount of participation in the political decision making of a community that adopts this 
sort of Confucian deliberative democracy will be less than that of others in the community who 
live longer. However, this is not a telling objection. On the one hand, such inequalities in life-
span are arguably beyond the scope of concerns about the sort of fairness of political processes. 
Furthermore, if we look at the amount of participation a person has in liberal deliberation over 
the course of her lifetime in a liberal deliberative democracy, those with shorter life-spans will 
have less overall chance to participate than those with longer life-spans. (Admittedly, the 
problem may still be bigger in this regard for Confucian deliberation, since in the case of a 
Confucian deliberation, a person’s overall amount of participation per year lived beyond the age 
of majority is only equalized at the time a person reaches the high end of the expected life-span 
in a community.) 
Perhaps the best response on the part of a defender of Confucian deliberation to a worry 
about differing life-spans is as follows: if we think of inequalities in actual life-span as a special 
case of inequalities in health more generally, then it is not obvious that Confucian deliberation is 
any worse off than liberal deliberation in this regard. Liberal deliberation, even in the quasi-ideal 
version we have been discussing, requires relatively robust health on the part of its practitioners. 
If the differences in actual health of community members is not thought to be a problem for the 
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fairness of liberal deliberation, then it is not clear why differences in actual age span should 
undermine the sense in which Confucian deliberation allows for equality of say over the course 
of an average life-span. 
On the other hand, insofar as either health in general or expected life-span in particular 
correlates with factors that we do not want to have influence a person’s ability to participate in a 
deliberative forum (be it liberal or Confucian), then we may want to think of ways to correct for 
that. Specifically, if health/life-span in a community correlates with socioeconomic class, 
racial/ethnic identity, gender/sex, or sexual orientation (or even with factors such as religious or 
political affiliation), then we may want to think about correcting for that in the allotment of time 
given to speakers in the deliberative forum. The issues here are tricky, and my hunch is that 
many of them are best left untouched, but the important point is that if we are worried about 
unfairness in the case of Confucian deliberation, we should be equally worried about it in the 
case of liberal deliberation, and there are ways in which we might correct for at least some of the 
unfairnesses in both kinds of deliberation. 
Of course, if allotting more speaking time in any given deliberative session to people who 
are older does not compromise political equality over the span of a typical human lifetime, then 
there are other, non-Confucian forms of deliberation that award age-dependent speaking times 
that are also not a threat to political equality on the scale of a typical lifetime. I have in mind 
possible proposals that would award more time to younger participants rather than to older 
participants (or even crazy, complicated proposals that would award more time to a person as her 
age approaches forty, then decreasing time as her age approaches fifty-one, and then increasing 
time until her age approaches sixty-four, and then gradually decreasing time as she ages from 
there on out). Such non- (or even anti-) Confucian proposals for structuring speaking-time 
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allotments in deliberation would also, it seems, not create political inequalities based on age over 
the course of a lifetime. I presume other factors could be used to rule them out (although “the 
young have more say” proposal might have its own merits, especially if we think about giving 
them more time to learn how to participate and then later to use their increased skills more 
efficiently in the shorter allotted times that come with increasing age). My point here is that a 
great many age-dependent ways of allotting deliberation opportunity (or even of allotting 
political “say” more broadly) might have their particular merits or demerits relative to liberal, 
“everyone has equal say” deliberation, but the only way in which the age-dependent unequal-
speaking-time proposal clearly seems to create a condition of unequal political opportunity is if 
we insist on looking at a person’s opportunity to participate in political decision making on a 
scale of time that is less than that of a full human lifetime. (In this regard, the Confucian proposal 
and the suggested non-Confucian, “young say more” proposals differ significantly from 
proposals that would allot speaking time in deliberation based upon gender/sex, racial or ethnic 
identity, economic class membership, etc.) 
I have considered a specific alternative to the “all adult citizens have equal political 
standing" model of liberal democracy by considering a hypothetical Confucian-inspired 
modification of a liberal deliberative democratic forum. However, we could also explore similar 
elder-favoring modifications of other, non-deliberation-focused democratic practices, such as 
voting schemes that allocate more votes to citizens as they age. On such a model, we might allow 
every citizen of voting age to get an additional vote for every so many years they are aged 
beyond the legal voting age. We might consider variations that would allow voters who have 
multiple age-determined votes in any given election the opportunity to spread their allocated 
votes among the available candidates or ballot-option possibilities, or we might stick to models 
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that require all of a voter's allocated votes to be given to a single candidate or single answer to a 
ballot question. And, of course, different ways of valuing age might be encoded in the voting 
procedure by how many additional votes we give to an individual on account of her age. While 
there will be important differences between a model of deliberative democracy that allocates 
speaking opportunities within a deliberative forum in a way that tracks age and a voting scheme 
that allocates votes in accord with a voter's age, what remains the same is the general idea that 
such an elder-valuing modification of liberal democracy provides a way of ensuring political 
equality over the course of an average lifetime while institutionalizing age-based political 
inequality at any given moment. 
<H1>Selves through Time, and Democratic Institutions 
<TX1>The exploration of what time scale to use when asking about equality or 
inequality of political opportunity highlights a feature of Confucianism that is obvious when 
thinking about that tradition in some contexts but that is sometimes neglected when thinking 
about Confucian approaches to politics and political theory: Confucianism emphasizes our 
situatedness as individuals in time and as members of communities that extend through time. 
Conversely, political liberalism can be seen (at least in many of its manifestations) as treating 
people as relatively dehistoricized beings. By thinking of people as rational, autonomous agents 
and at the same time thinking of rationality and autonomy as being universal and (in some sense) 
culturally and historically transcendent, political liberalism arguably conceives of people as 
being outside the histories of their individual lives and the histories of their communities. 
Confucianism, in contrast, emphasizes the way in which historical tradition and the progression 
of time infuse a community and an individual human life (at least when a human life is 
appropriately lived). It insists that we look at people as beings that live through extended periods 
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of time, changing in significant ways as they do so, and filling different roles within a 
community as they age and master ritual, virtue, and so on. 
<TX>At one level of description, we can say that a Confucian-inspired democratic 
political system that allocates political opportunity within a democracy at least partially in accord 
with age sees life as a journey of the self through time, whereas standard political liberalism sees 
all adults as having "made it," as it were, once they have reached the age of majority. The 
Confucian-inspired deliberative forum and the corresponding voting schema considered earlier 
institutionalize an acknowledgment that people tend to change with age, and they make this fact 
central to a person's political standing within a democracy in a way that standard liberal 
democracy does not, since standard liberal democracy does not mark the fact that there is such 
expected change in adults as they age within the political procedures of democracy themselves. 
Of course, to be fair, liberals can acknowledge that, among the adults who are deemed to 
be political equals within a community, there are likely going to be differences in political 
perspective and preference, not to mention wisdom and general state of mind, that correlate at 
least roughly with a person's age. After all, almost everyone acknowledges that as most people 
age, they tend to develop a kind of perspective that is informed by past experiences and often 
contains a kind of wisdom that is lacking in youth (although, in contrast, some people instead 
simply become more jaded or narrow-minded as they age). And, of course, there are the 
expectable losses in a person's cognitive and emotional capacities that do or will likely 
accompany old age in many of us. 
Although political liberalism does not attempt to work those expectable changes over the 
course of a lifetime into the institutional framework of democracy in any way (except insofar as 
it does not allow children to participate fully in political decision making), there seems to be no 
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reason to think that liberalism itself is ultimately incompatible with a conception of selfhood as 
essentially amounting to a progressive journey through time than is the sort of Confucianism 
expressed in Analects 2.4: 
<EXT>The Master said: "From fifteen, my heart-and-mind was set 
upon learning; from thirty I took my stance; from forty I was no 
longer doubtful; from fifty I realized the propensities of tian 
(tianming 天命); from sixty my ear was attuned; from seventy I 
could give my heart-and-mind free reign without overstepping the 
boundaries."18 
<TX1>In short, the liberal vision of all adult citizens as having political equality at all moments 
does not make explicit what might reasonably be expected to happen to a person as she journeys 
through adulthood, but its vision of responsible adult participation in a political community is at 
least minimally compatible with acknowledging that citizenship plays out against a complex 
backdrop of aging and changing individual selves. 
<TX> Nevertheless, standard political liberalism sees expected age-dependent differences 
between and changes over time in adult citizens as being irrelevant to their status as political 
equals, in the same way that differences in economic status and non-age-related social status are 
seen as being irrelevant to the kind of political equality on which liberalism focuses. Just as 
economic and non-age-dependent social status are deemed irrelevant to political standing by 
liberalism (except insofar as what liberalism takes to be extreme cases of economic or social 
privilege might bubble over and undermine meaningful political equality), likewise differences 
in social status and perspective that at least roughly correlate with age are deemed irrelevant (but 
again, except insofar as those differences might bubble over and make a difference in political 
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equality—but here liberalism tends to see only being younger than the age of majority as an age-
relevant difference that legitimately impacts the relative political standing of citizens). Political 
liberalism in effect abstracts away from age-dependent differences among adult citizens, at least 
when theorizing about public policy and political decision making. 
 Seen in this way, the Confucian-inspired approach is arguably preferable, since the liberal 
version might be taken to amount to a willful ignorance of the expectable effects of aging: since 
people do tend to develop as they age—and do so in roughly predictable ways—why shouldn't 
our political institutions and practices take that into account by awarding more political 
responsibility to citizens as they age, especially since doing so is compatible with a meaningful 
political equality, albeit one that is visible only diachronically rather than synchronically? Even 
if the particular details of the Confucian deliberative forum or the age-tracking voting schema 
discussed earlier as examples are not acceptable, it still might seem as if some Confucian-
inspired schema of institutionalizing age-dependent political status would track a relevant feature 
of human life—the obvious fact that we tend to change with age. If a Confucian-inspired 
democracy tracks that change while a standard liberal democracy does not, isn’t that in itself a 
point in favor of the Confucian-inspired form of democracy? 
<H1>Age or Youth? 
<TX1>Of course, even if we are open to the notion of developing democratic institutions 
and practices that track age while maintaining political equality over the course of an average 
adult lifetime, it is not obvious that correlating increased political influence with increasing age 
is in all cases better than, say, correlating increased political influence with youth. Consider the 
common wisdom one often hears scientists or mathematicians express, at least in certain kinds of 
conversations, according to which great and innovative discoveries are rarely made by anyone 
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over the age of thirty, or consider the ways in which some businesses in certain situations—say, 
the dot-com heyday of the late 1990s and early 2000s—tend to turn to youthful leadership 
precisely because young CEOs are seen as being more likely than older business leaders to better 
guide certain kinds of organizations in times of rapid change. Such situations in which common 
wisdom (whatever that is) trumpets the comparative value of a youthful perspective are at least 
arguably the exception rather than the rule when thinking about what sort of age-correlated 
judgment and perspective are most likely to contain the most insight and wisdom. At the same 
time, however, there are scientific mentors and various management consultants—not to mention 
many, many other people—who think there are cases where the predictable perspectives of the 
aged are less likely to be on the mark than those of the young might. The mere fact of this 
tendency to privilege youth should give us pause in thinking that a Confucian-inspired age-
dependent democratic political scheme provides a viable alternative to an “all adult citizens are 
always politically equal” scheme, even if we are willing to say that there is no relevant difference 
in the kind of political equality among citizens in the two schemes that would lead us to favor 
one over the other on that basis alone. 
<TX> We might also worry that a Confucian-inspired age-dependent democratic system would 
tend to favor certain policy choices over others. In other words, by giving the elderly more say, 
the system would tend to be conservative or simply to favor policies that benefit the elderly, or 
whatever. Here we would need empirical data to nail down whether any particular policy choices 
would be likely to be favored by a Confucian-inspired system in general, but it seems reasonable 
to suppose that an age-favoring democratic procedure would be likely to shift the policy 
outcomes in somewhat predictable ways. Regardless of whether such policy outcomes are 
acceptable, the mere fact that age-favoring procedures could be expected to benefit some policy 
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choices over others might seem to show that there is something wrong with building such age-
tracking mechanisms into democratic institutions, since doing so is not merely a procedural 
change but instead amounts to taking a de facto political stand on substantive issues. 
To the extent that we feel the pull of such an objection, we must already be committed to 
some broadly liberal democratic conception of state neutrality, at least among policy options that 
are equally likely to protect basic liberal democratic rights. But even if we accept that the 
institutional mechanisms of a democracy should be as neutral as possible vis-à-vis the likely 
policy debates they are intended to resolve, the mere fact that a Confucian-inspired age-
dependent set of democratic institutions is likely to favor some policy choices over others in 
contrast to a more straightforwardly liberal set of institutions does not give us reason to favor the 
liberal set of institutions, since they themselves can be seen as favoring their own set of policy 
choices. At this level of description, there seems to be no set of policy choices that is obviously 
the set that is more neutral overall. Even if we can predict which kinds of policy choices would 
emerge from a Confucian age-dependent democratic system and which would emerge from a 
liberal “all adult citizens are always politically equal” system and we are committed to the idea 
that the democratic institutions themselves be as neutral as possible with regard to associated 
substantive policy choices, there still is no good reason to favor the non-Confucian system over 
the Confucian one on the basis of which is more neutral. 
<H1>Informal and Formal Mechanisms of Implementation 
<TX1>I have considered the pros and cons of formalized versions of a Confucian-
inspired age-valuing democratic procedure—either in the form of a deliberative forum that 
allocates speaking time on the basis of age or, more briefly, in the form of a voting mechanism 
that allocates more votes per election to citizens as they age. I turn now to a deliberative forum 
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where Confucian norms of valuing the elderly do their work only informally. Imagine a 
deliberative-democratic forum in which the explicit procedures that guide deliberation are of a 
non-Confucian sort and where official speaking time is allocated equally to all participants. Even 
if a moderator were present at this imaginary forum to enforce time limits, if the people 
participating are acculturated in Confucian norms of deference to the elderly, then younger 
participants might be expected to limit their own speaking time to something shorter than the 
maximum. Maybe the younger members would allocate their unused speaking time to older 
participants, if that is allowed. There are numerous other ways in which Confucian-inspired 
norms could play out informally in a deliberative forum, even in the absence of any explicit 
measures to enforce them. Younger speakers could make reference to what elder members have 
previously said as they give their own remarks in the forum; younger members could signal their 
deference to elder members in subtle ways by what they say and how they say it; elder members 
could have their say toward the end of the deliberation session such that their temporal position 
in the order of speakers would be analogous to the privileged seats at the table at a Chinese 
dinner banquet;19 or, all else being equal, it could simply be that everyone participating in the 
forum would take the comments of the most elderly more seriously than those of younger 
participants. Depending on how deep Confucian values run, we can easily picture a situation in 
which the de facto age deference manifested within a deliberative forum, however explicitly 
structured to allocate equal speaking opportunities to all, might approximate or even equal the 
age deference of the Confucian-inspired deliberative forum discussed earlier. 
<TX> It is more difficult to imagine a case in which Confucian age deference so strongly 
influences a non-age-tracking voting procedure. But even in that case there are ways in which 
informal Confucian valuation of the elderly might influence voting outcomes. Even if every 
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citizen has only one vote in an election, the background valuing of the elderly in a Confucian 
community might significantly influence election outcomes, despite there being no explicit 
mechanism encoding that Confucian value in the voting procedures themselves. 
 In short, in communities in which Confucian values are strong and widely held, we might 
find a Confucian-influenced age-deference system in effect grafted onto straightforwardly liberal 
democratic institutions and procedures in such a way that the overall functioning and outcome of 
the institutions will significantly approximate what we would get with an explicitly Confucian 
age-valuing model of the sort discussed previously. In assessing democratic institutions that are 
infused by Confucian age deference but without any formal structuring to reinforce that 
deference, it seems there could be no real objection from advocates of straightforward liberalism. 
Yes, these institutions would be influenced by Confucianism, perhaps even heavily, but the 
policy-forming mechanisms themselves would not encode the values of a specifically Confucian 
conception of the good society. In that way, it would seem possible to have a Confucian-inspired 
democracy, at least in the dimension of deference to valuing of the aged, without in most cases 
raising any liberal hackles. Of course, if the Confucian valuation of the aged becomes so strong 
or gets manifested in a such a way that it muffles the voices of younger members or somehow 
interferes with the policy-making decisions of the community, defenders of liberalism would 
object.20 In moderation, though, a set of deliberative or voting procedures that do not mark age 
deference explicitly and formally but that are influenced informally by the Confucian age 
deference might approximate the features of the explicit age-valuing mechanisms discussed 
previously, but in a way that is more tolerable, and indeed more likely to be manifest, in real-
world communities. 
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 To the extent that the informal mechanisms would approximate the more formal versions 
of Confucian-inspired age-valuing democracy, they would still encode a vision of the self as 
extended through time. And, as in the case of the formal models considered in this chapter, 
participation in the democratic practices would influence the way people act and think about 
themselves. True, the way in which the vision of the self is extended through time would make a 
practical difference in the minds and self-conceptions of participants in those more formalized 
versions of age-valuing democratic procedures, but even then the influence on participants would 
presumably be subtle. Whether or not the Confucian age deference were formalized in the 
deliberative forum or the voting procedures, participants would probably not be influenced in 
such a way that they would think explicitly of themselves as being extended in time. Rather they 
might be expected to learn those lessons more slowly, and largely without being conscious of it, 
by participating over time in the democratic institutions that are age valuing. So these 
explorations into the ways to work age valuing into deliberative or nondeliberative democracy in 
explicit ways would be relevant to any kind of liberal democracy in a significantly Confucian 
context. The extent to which the Confucian-inspired valuation of the elderly impacts people 
through the conception of the self through time that it encodes is an open question—one perhaps 
best answered by social scientists doing empirical work. 
<H1>Conclusion 
<TX1>I have considered in this essay two different kinds of democratic decision-making 
procedures. First, there is a straightforward liberal kind of procedure that tries to ensure political 
equality among citizens at all moments. In deliberative democracy, such a procedure allocates 
equal speaking time within the deliberative forum. Not only does such an "all adult citizens are 
always political equals" model of democracy attempt to abstract away from differences between 
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citizens in terms of their economic and non-age-based social statuses, but it also—as we have 
seen in the Confucian-inspired procedures discussed in this chapter—attempts to abstract away 
from the expectable changes and developments in a person's faculties of judgment and 
perspective as she ages.  
<TX>Second, there is a Confucian-inspired procedure that privileges age and favors the 
elderly either (1) by allocating increased speaking time in deliberative forums to older 
participants or (2) by allocating increased votes to citizens as they age. This Confucian-inspired 
alternative can, like the standard liberal approach, abstract away from differences in economic 
and non-age-based social status in order to emphasize some sort of real or imagined political 
equality among citizens, but the kind of political equality here is one that is manifest only at the 
scale of complete human lifetimes. Importantly, the Confucian-inspired procedures do not 
abstract away from expectable changes in a person's faculties of judgment as she ages. 
Although I have introduced this Confucian alternative in contrast to a standard liberal 
model of deliberative democracy, it might be more proper to see it as potentially only a variation 
of liberal deliberative democracy, since, as I have argued, it is compatible with protecting a kind 
of political equality in the face of property-rights-derived differences in economic and other 
social status. I have considered various ways in which one might try to defend the standard 
liberal model over the Confucian one, but none of the discussed considerations demonstrates that 
one or the other model is clearly preferable in all cases. That, in itself, is of interest. 
The Confucian-inspired model does seem likely to reinforce among its participants a 
conception of the self as something that is essentially spread out in time and subject to a 
predictable sort of development and growth over time. This might be something to count in favor 
of the Confucian approach—but even here, it is not clear whether it is a good thing. Getting 
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people to think, however explicitly, about themselves—or at least their political selves—as being 
on a journey through time might encourage them to take longer-term perspectives on political 
questions, and it might encourage people to be patient and more thoughtful as they gradually 
move up in influence as they participate in democratic institutions over the years. But it could 
alternatively encourage complacency among the young, or even a kind of self-centered arrogance 
among the elderly. 
So, it seems as if there is a hypothetical, Confucian-inspired, age-valuing alternative to a 
standard version of liberal democracy, and it seems as if it is at least potentially as legitimate as 
the standard, “all adult citizens always have equal political status” model. Whether it really 
would be a preferable alternative would depend on a host of microlevel considerations that will 
vary with particular context and the needs of various communities. At the very least, such an 
alternative is worth considering when thinking about ways to encourage democratization on the 
small and even large scale in Confucian-friendly cultural contexts, and it points to an often 
unnoticed way in which democratic institutions can shape our sense of ourselves as beings 
located in and developing through time. 
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<NT>Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2008 Central Division Meeting of the 
American Philosophy Association (under the title “Deliberation, Ritual, and Equality") during a 
special session sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian & Asian-American 
Philosophers and Philosophies and at the 2007 Southeastern Conference of the Association of 
Asian Studies meeting (under the title “Deliberative Interactions and Confucian Perspectives 
[Liberal and Confucian Deliberation]”). I benefited from feedback received from the audiences 
and the other participants in both of those sessions, and I am grateful to Brooke Ackerly for 
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serving as the formal commentator for the session at the 2007 presentation. I received 
particularly helpful feedback from Daniel A. Bell on one of those earlier versions of the paper. I 
also wish to thank the audience at the Tenth East West Philosophers' Conference for their 
feedback after my presentation of the more mature version of this paper in May 2011 and at least 
one anonymous reviewer for additional feedback. 
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hierarchy could allow for an inequality of ruler(s) and ruled. In any case, I am not considering 
any such hierarchy—exploitable or not—in the hypothetical Confucian deliberative democracy I 
discuss. 
As for the man/woman inequality, in line with what a number of commentators have 
suggested (see Ackerly, “Is Liberalism the Only Way toward Democracy?” 557 and 574n54), if 
we allow contemporary political liberalism to treat men and women as political equals in spite of 
the history of the cultures from which such liberalisms emerged, there is no reason (or at least no 
obvious reason) why we could not analogously detach Confucianism from the gender inequalities 
of its history, even while retaining some of the other social hierarchies from its history. 
By thinking about age and bracketing the other sources of social inequality that are part 
of classical Confucianism, I do not mean to indicate that age inequality could function by itself 
in such a way as to give us a distinctively Confucian way of life, nor do I claim that 
Confucianism lends itself easily to the breaking off of particular features and separating them 
from the rest. I only mean to say that we have to begin somewhere, and I think we can begin by 
thinking about ways in which the age dimension of an unequal Confucian social hierarchy might 
challenge and inform a liberal ideal of democratic deliberation. 
16 See Bell, “Deliberative Democracy with Chinese Characteristics,” 151. 
17 See James S. Fishkin, Baogang He, and Alice Shu, “The First Chinese Deliberative Poll,” in 
The Search for Deliberative Democracy in China, ed. Ethan J. Leib and Baogang He (New York: 
Palgrave, 2006), 229–244 (esp. 237–238); as well James S. Fishkin, "Realizing Deliberative 
Democracy: Strategies for Democratic Consultation," in The Search for Deliberative Democracy 
in China, ed. Ethan J. Leib and Baogang He (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 37–52; and Fishkin’s 
earlier work. 
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18Analects 2.4; translation from Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr., trans., The Analects of 
Confucius: A Philosophical Translation (New York: Ballantine Books, 1998).  
19 See again Bell, “Deliberative Democracy with Chinese Characteristics,” 151, where he 
discusses seating arrangements in Chinese deliberative forums. 
20 And, indeed, we can imagine John Stuart Mill objecting, especially if the Confucian influence 
becomes the sort of strong social pressure he worries about in On Liberty (1859; Mineola, NY: 
Dover Publications, 2002) as being an infringement on individual liberty even in the absence of 
explicit legal sanctions. Mill himself is, to say the least, not a fan of the "despotism of custom" 
that he thinks is characteristic of China in the nineteenth century; see Mill, On Liberty, chap. 3. 
